Military Burden and the Democracy Puzzle by Rota, Mauro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Military Burden and the Democracy
Puzzle
Mauro Rota
25. November 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35254/
MPRA Paper No. 35254, posted 7. December 2011 16:33 UTC
1 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Military burden and the democracy puzzle§ 
 
First draft 11th April 2011  
This draft:25th November 2011 
 
 
 
Mauro Rota** 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Kantian thought had advanced the idea that wars and military expenditure should decrease 
as long as democracy widens across the World. Historical evidence seems to invalidate this 
wisdom because frequency of wars is increasing over time and a large amount of public 
resources is still being committed to military spending. This paper contributes to explain this 
point by considering the effect of polity regimes on the military spending during the period 
1880-1938. Indeed, before World War I the more democratic countries spent more for military 
purposes than autocracies whereas the reverse is true after 1920. This puzzling behaviour is 
therefore explained by the inconsistent timing between the ability of a state to drain resources 
by taxation (state fiscal capacity) and the political participation. Thus, the Kantian idea of a 
democratic and peaceful world seems to hold only for full democracy with large political 
participation. 
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I 
In 1795 Immanuel Kant claimed that the spread of democracy would reduce the 
opportunity to wage a war, providing an incentive to lower military expenditure (Kant, [1795] 
1917). However, historical data show that the frequency of wars is growing over time although 
democratization as well as other factors, such as trade openness and globalization, has 
broadened in the last two hundred years (Harrison and Wolf, 2011). Furthermore, a relevant 
amount of public resources is still being committed to military expenditure in both developed 
and developing countries. 
The aim of this work is to explain why and how had the Kantian (and liberal) hypothesis 
and the empirical evidence diverged. An early answer hitherto has come from the state fiscal 
capacity (Harrison and Wolf, 2011). The higher the state fiscal capacity, the larger the amount 
of public resources to wage a war, and the higher the frequency of war is. A further response 
stems from the interaction between the state fiscal capacity and the stage of democratization. 
Albeit several applied studies in economics have found a negative relationship between the 
upswing of democracy and the military expenditure (Dunne et al. 2003, 2008, Collier and 
Hoffler 2004, 2007a, 2007b), they do not provide a final evidence of the Kantian hypothesis of a 
democratic and peaceful world. The major drawback of those studies is that they focus only on 
the developing countries neglecting more advanced nations because their polity regimes are 
not variable enough to test the impact of an increase in democracy on the military expenditure. 
Furthermore, there was little space in the economic history studies to analyse the effect of a 
change in the polity regimes on the military spending because of the main focus on the 
mobilization of the two World Wars (Harrison, 1998, Harrison and Broadberry, 2005, Eloranta, 
2007). 
The present paper exploits the variability of polity regimes during the period 1880-1938 
to evaluate the role of democracy patterns in the military burden formation. As the historical 
period under scrutiny is characterized by the first wave of democratization (1880-1925) and by 
the reverse movements towards totalitarianism (1926 onwards), it provides the ideal setting to 
explore different policies towards the military spending.  
By considering the as large as possible set of countries observed in the period 1880-
1938, the analysis shows that the diffusion of the democracy was not a ‘seal of approval’ of low 
military expenditure. The more democratic countries of the pre- World War I era are those with 
the higher military burden and only after World War I the democratization reduced military 
expenditure. In fact, the liberal effect of democracy entered at work during the reverse wave 
towards autocracy whereas the first wave of democratization brought about a severe increase 
in the military spending. In order to disentangle this puzzle, many confounding factors at work 
are to be considered.  
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The key elements are the state fiscal capacity and the public control in wielding the 
government decisions. The public control is the result of a larger political participation which in 
turn is crucial to orient the executive choices about the military spending. Democracies turn out 
to be fuller when the political participation is large, the regulatory constraints are binding and 
the recruitment of the executive is competitive. On the contrary, the limited or non-full 
democracies often have a low degree both in the political participation and regulatory 
constraints whereas autocracies lack at least of one of them.  
Several late nineteenth century countries modernized bureaucracies developing the 
state capacity to drain resources through taxation but the political participation lagged behind. 
Thus, the inconsistent timing between the bureaucracy modernization and political participation 
relaxed the constraints of the policy makers to allocate public funds. From a historical point of 
view, the outcome was the increase in spending for defence aimed at the consolidation of the 
borders, competition for colonies, exploitations of foreign resources, maintenance of the regime 
in charge and feeding the domestic elites. After World War I, the political participation widened 
throughout enfranchisement, and the demand for social spending dramatically rose. The 
improvement of democracy throughout a wider political participation reduced the freedom of 
policy makers and exerted more pressure on the allocation of public resource squeezing the 
military burden. Indeed, historical analysis suggests that the liberal claim of peaceful 
democracies holds only if the political participation is wide. 
This paper can also have implications for the present. The first one is that non-full 
democracies spend more for defence than autocracies and full democracies, as several 
theoretical studies suggest (Hess and Orphanides 2000, Baliga et. alt. 2011 ). A further lesson 
we can learn is that the current wave of democratization will not necessary drive towards a 
more peaceful environment unless the democracies in transition open the political participation 
as much as possible. 
The rest of the paper reviews the basic literature in section II and provides readers with 
the data description in section III. Possible connections between polity regimes and military 
expenditure are discussed in section IV. Section V presents the democracy puzzle in the 
historical data. Section VI discusses some general explanations of the puzzlement whereas 
section VII tests the components of the polity regimes in search of further explanations. Section 
VIII concludes. 
 
II 
The literature in this field covering the second half of twentieth century history gave 
much attention to the role of democracy. The emphasis was  mainly on the democratization of 
Africa and Asia in the last forty years. In most of those studies, the democracy turns out to be a 
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‘seal of approval’ of low military burden (Collier and Hoffler, 2004, 2007a, 2007b). The idea is 
that polity regimes with a high level of competition for power, of constraints to the executive 
incumbents and of popular participation would reduce military expenditure because 
democracies generally put greater value on the peace dividend. This intuition is not completely 
satisfactory as the transmission channels from democracy to the military spending (and to 
wars) are more knotty than one might expect. A possible theoretical explanation is provided by 
Alesina and Spoalore (2005, 2006) who built a model in which the peace dividend is smaller 
than one would expect when the democracy spreads. The reason is that whenever both 
democracy spreads and the number of nations increases there are more chances of conflicts 
occurring at a regional level. Hess and Orphanides (2001) remarked that democratization does 
not lead to a more peaceful world and that wars are just as frequent and possible when 
democracy widens. 
In a nutshell, the economic literature is split into two different views. The theory predicts that 
democratization is not necessarily the road to a peaceful world whereas applied contributions 
provide us with evidence that democracy is a way of reducing the military burden and the 
frequency of wars. Recently, some applied works have also raised concerns on the effective 
strength of democratization. For example, taking a very long run perspective Harrison and Wolf 
(2011) have found that democratization as well as trade openness and globalization is not an 
insurance against the outbreak of conflicts. In their view, the key element to understanding the 
puzzlement is the state capacity to acquire resources through taxation. The argument appears 
to be: more democracy implies more constraints on government which tend to reduce both the 
probability of war and hence the military expenditure. At the same time, democratization 
increases state capacity to raise public finance and thereby the chances of waging a war3.  
However, democracy is an open-end defined concept that requires some considerations. 
Recent studies have discussed whether binding term limits to government lead to a higher 
probability to democracies waging war than democracies without term limits (Conconi et. alt., 
2008). The non-fully democratic countries also raise some concerns. Indeed, Baliga et al.  
(2011) show that limited democracies are even more aggressive than autocracies. 
Other possible explanations of the military expenditure demand are connected to the arms 
race framework introduced by Richardson (1960). In fact, empirical tests have proven that the 
arms race model is inconsistent with data in the majority of cases, such as the US/USSR, 
India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, and Arab/Israel. Oren (1994) has also shown that the arms race effect 
does not hold whenever the hostility level between two countries is controlled for. Indeed, the 
dyadic perspective has been replaced by the ‘Security Web’ concept (Rosh, 1988) and by the 
external threat of the potential enemies (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003a, 2003b) and of 
                                               
3
 This point is also sustained in a theoretical framework by Besley and Torsten (2009). 
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neighbours (Collier and Hoffler, 2004). These improved approaches have found a strong 
relationship between military expenditure and the external environment.  
Finally, Harrison (1998), Broadberry and Harrison (2005), Eloranta (2007) are the main 
contributions which have adopted a historical perspective to describe military expenditure 
patterns. They concentrate on the mobilization of the belligerents in the World War II, in the 
World War I and in the arm race of 1870-1913, respectively. The main results are that the level 
of available resources, proxied by per capita GDP, mattered in the mobilization of the two 
World Wars, while the lack of leadership, the external threats from potential enemies and the 
spillover from allies determined the arms race towards the 1914 events.  
If these are the research questions and the results of the existing literature, what remains 
uncovered? Firstly, the most of the aforesaid papers focuses on either probability or frequency 
of war, but military expenditure also deserves attention. Secondly, why and in which way do 
democracies (or autocracies) deploy a different behaviour from the Kantian hypothesis? 
Thirdly, looking inside democracy patterns in detail, it is possible that some aspects of 
democracy have tighter links to the military expenditure. Indeed, which component matters 
more for democracy in the historical context for the proper working of the liberal claim of a 
peaceful world? 
 Before discussing possible explanations which can provide a set of answers to the 
aforementioned questions, it is necessary to present the data used in the quantitative analysis.       
       
 
III 
The key variable employed in my study is the country’s military burden defined as the ratio 
between military expenditure and GDP. The broadly used dataset in the military burden 
analysis is the Correlates of War project (COW) originally collected by Singer (1972) and 
constantly updated4. Although other historical data on military expenditure have been recorded 
(Banks 1976, Hobson 1993, Eloranta 2002), the COW dataset still remains the most complete 
covering a large number of countries and a wide time span. None of the previous datasets is 
free of shortcomings and pitfalls but the researcher should choose the lesser evil. In historical 
researches, the coverage of time and the spatial dimension are the common data constrictions 
and the COW dataset allows us to relax such constraints5.  
Moreover, the military expenditure collected by the COW project primarily uses the 
same sources of other datasets- i. e. the government balance sheets- but adopts a different 
                                               
4
 This paper uses the latest version of National Material Capabilities (version 4.0) released in June 2010. 
5
 A characteristic of the COW dataset is that figures of military expenditure are in pound sterling until 1914 and in US 
dollars afterwards. Indeed, they had to be converted in national currency using the bilateral exchange rates. It 
required a data intensive process.  
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way to classifying the military outlays. Because the prime interest of the COW dataset is to 
weigh out military capability across countries the definitions of military expenditure deals with 
each outlays aimed at enhancing military power. For these reasons, the appropriations for 
expenditures on pensions, superannuation payments, relief and subsidies to widows and 
orphans are excluded as well as the expenditure for the civilian police force which used to be 
under military control. On the contrary, other appropriations are added to the military budget 
when related to the national military capability.  
Table 1 presents the military burden statistics for the sample countries. For the purpose 
of comparability I have excluded the figures of the Great War6. The sample covers almost all 
the relevant countries of each period under scrutiny. Unfortunately, data on the nominal GDP of 
the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, Serbia, Chile, Poland and the Soviet Union are not 
available to build their correspondent military burden. Data for China are also scattered. Unlike 
previous studies, this paper offers a wider coverage of the independent countries and for the 
first time compares new political entities and old-established countries in the interwar period7. In 
the pre-World War I era Latin American countries have been added and also observed in the 
interwar years. Even though Romania and Bulgaria became independent in 1878 and 1908 
respectively, they are included in the sample only from the early twenties onward because of 
data’s paucity.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
As the main task of this paper is to better understand the role of the polity regimes in the 
formation of the military burden, it is worth discussing the polity variable. The definition of a 
political pattern is ambiguous in the political science literature. Scholars concentrate on two 
concepts: democracy and autocracy. The former raises more questioned because of the 
uncertain definitions of what matters for democracy. Competition for power, chances to 
challenging the official government and political participation are the pillars to build democracy 
(Lipset 1960 and Sartori 1987). As a consequence, the translation of the concept of democracy 
                                               
6
 The military burden is obviously impressive for the Great Powers during the World War I and it could obscure 
possible comparisons. Figures for the arms race of First World War are even available upon request. Higher figures 
appearing in the table are the maximum values for Japan in conjunction with the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
and China invasion (1937-1938), Italy in conjunction with the colonial war in Ethiopia (1935-1937) and Germany in 
conjunction with invasion of Austria (1938). 
7
 The studies by Harrison (1998), Broadberry and Harrison (2005) cover respectively six Great Powers in the World 
War II and eight countries in the World War I (4 allied, 3 central powers and one neutral country, including for the first 
time the Ottoman Empire). Eloranta (2007) covers sixteen Western countries in the 1870-1913. Hobson (1993) 
covers only the six Great Powers. The sample countries in my study, including pre and post World War I era, are: 
Argentina, Hapsburg Empire (AUH), Australia (AUL), Austria (AUS) Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Bulgaria (BUL), 
Canada (CAN), Czech-Republic (CZE), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRN), Germany (GMY), Hungary 
(HUN), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Mexico (MEX), New Zealand (NEW), Norway (NOR), NTH (Netherlands), Peru 
(PER), Portugal (POR), Romania (ROM), Tsarist Russia (RUS), Spain (SPN), Sweden (SWD), Switzerland (SWZ), 
United Kingdom (UKG), Uruguay (URU), United States (USA), Venezuela (VEN), Yugoslavia (YUG). 
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into a quantitative variable is carefully considered. In the present paper I will rely on a broadly 
used dataset, the PolityIV project (Marshall et al., 2010). The dataset offers the Polity2 variable 
which is a composite measure of both the democratic and autocratic features of an authority 
pattern. Even though Polity2 masks various combinations of democracy and autocracy, it is 
useful for capturing general changes in the political regimes. In fact, democracy and autocracy 
are somewhat different representations of authority patterns. They account for regulations, 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints to executive actions, 
regulation and competitiveness of political participation. Indeed, the original spirit was to 
conceive that mixed elements of autocracy and democracy may coexist in any particular 
regime.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
IV 
The assumption that more democratic countries allocate fewer resources to military 
spending is a milestone of the Liberal thought. Liberal and democratic regimes would be more 
interested in citizens’ welfare and the negative effect of an arms race should discourage the 
waging of a war and military spending. Historical data (Figure 1) and political science literature 
(Fordham and Walker, 2005) seem to confirm an inverse association between democratization 
and military burden. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
From a visual inspection of the unconditional association between polity regime and military 
burden in my sample, it emerges that the unlikely combination is high autocracy with low 
military burden. Furthermore, high levels of military expenditure may be possible regardless of 
whether the regime is autocratic or democratic oriented and only in very few cases low military 
expenditure is associated with a highly democratic regime as common sense would suggest. 
The inverse relation seems to be more evident in the period 1920-1938 whereas the fitted 
curve is almost flat in the period 1880-1913. The visual inspection of data would also suggest 
the effectiveness of the liberal claim. However, other historical evidence (war frequency) and an 
unclear relationship in the years before World War I lead us to consider the hypothesis of 
several confounding factors at work (Harrison and Wolf 2011).  
Moreover, the interwar period is a watershed for the polity pattern across the World. Until 
the mid-twenties a first wave of democratization struck the World whereas a reverse process 
toward autocracy took place after 1926 (Huntington 1991, Doorenspleet 2000). The two waves 
are in principle inconsistent with the evidence of a strong negative association between 
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democratic polity regime and military burden in the interwar years. Global democratization 
slackened from 1926 onwards, but the military burden fell. Nonetheless, the spread of 
democracy of the nineteenth century did not ward off the Great War.  
The confounding factors at work were manifold and both democracy and autocracy had 
elements to influence the military burden in either a positive or negative way. 
A common view is that the autocratic regimes usually spend a higher share of public 
resources for military purpose than democratic countries. The idea is that autocratic regimes 
are frequently sustained by influential armies which bargain with the political power to raise 
military expenditure in return for deterrence from external or internal threats. However, this is 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for an autocratic regime to survive8.  
Moreover, the argument of the external threat can be applied to newly established countries 
regardless of whether they are democratic or autocratic. Countries which reached sudden 
independence in association with democratization tended to have high military burdens to 
consolidate the new borders or to prevent the threat of losing independence. Whenever the 
new country was managed by an autocracy this cost got higher and higher. 
A recent strand in the literature has put the emphasis on the state fiscal capacity in order to 
explain the frequency of wars across the last two centuries (Harrison and Wolf 2011). State 
fiscal capacity is the bureaucracy’s ability to drain resources through taxation. Democratization 
and modern bureaucracy formation went hand in hand creating a gap of available resources 
between polity regimes with modern bureaucracies and polity regimes with ancient agrarian 
bureaucracy. The more the resources were available the larger public expenditure was. Thus, 
the more democratic the regimes, the larger the government outlays were. From this point of 
view, the transmission channel from bureaucracy modernization to military expenditure is 
positive. On the contrary, ancient bureaucracies had limited fiscal capacity and were less prone 
to burden a high share of public expenditure even for military purposes. Since the ancient 
bureaucracies were the norm in the autocratic regimes, the pattern of military expenditure could 
be negatively influenced by autocratic executives.  
The prediction of an inverse relationship between democratization associated with 
bureaucracy’s modernization and military expenditure is not the whole story for a 
comprehensive historical analysis. The link between democratization, higher fiscal capacity and 
military expenditure depends on the social perception of  the war and peace dividend, and on 
the redistributive policies. In fact, democratic regimes usually sustain social spending (though 
the intensity varies according the historical period and the political preferences) and an 
                                               
8
 On the reverse, the persistence of the regime at home is sustained in certain periods by paramilitary forces which 
are excluded by the measure of military expenditure of the COW dataset. Eventually, the military burden is not 
necessary the main channel through which polity regimes endowed an influential army. The accession to high role of 
public enterprises or special granting in running private business has been often preferred to the increase of military 
budget. 
9 | P a g e  
 
increase in military expenditure may be perceived by the citizens in terms of a trade off with 
social spending. The fulfilment of democracy is the broadest political participation and thereby 
an increase of democratic control on executive decisions. The democratic control might 
suggest a reduction in military expenditure throughout the perception of the value of the peace 
dividend for society and should strengthen the demand for more social spending. Indeed, in the 
presence of a non-full democracy it may be possible that the association with the military 
burden is positive and that the Kantian effect of a peaceful world holds only for full democracy, 
via a wide public control. 
 
V 
The existing literature provides many other variables of interest which test the military 
burden determinants. I have borrowed a set of suitable controls from early and recent literature 
in order to isolate as precisely as possible the effect of  polity patterns on the military burden 
formation. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2007a) claimed that the military expenditure of one country is 
determined by the perceived external threats in the area a country belongs to, and by the 
internal threats of rebellions. Along the same strand, Dunne et al. (2008) look at the behaviour 
of developing countries, finding that military expenditure is strongly related to the `Security 
Web’ (i.e. all neighbours and other security-influencing powers), and to the aggregate military 
spending of ‘Potential Enemies’. The systematic study of Eloranta (2007) for sixteen western 
countries in the race to World War I clarified that the arms race of individual countries 
responded to the threats from perceived enemies. 
However historical facts suggest that before World War I the bulk of military competition 
involved the Great Powers and that even in the interwar period the competition often took place 
in the form of global rivalry with the main competitor rather than with its neighbours. Henceforth, 
I use the concept of main competitor adapted it to the historical context. The structure of the 
alliances is quite misleading and, as Eloranta (2007) remarked, the perceived threat went 
beyond formal arrangements by states. Italy had a treatise of alliances with the Hapsburg 
Empire but they perceived each other as enemies. After the dismantling of the Empire, the new 
threat for Italy was the United Kingdom due to the colonial dispute. At other times the choice of 
the main competitor is more difficult. In the absence of an actual competitor I based on purely 
geographic proximity using the concept of neighbour’s threat such as for Canada and Australia. 
In other cases the lack of data led me to a compromised choice of the main competitor. 
Bulgaria perceived Turkey as the main competitor during the interwar period. As data on the 
Ottoman Empire and Turkey are not available in my sample, I have matched Bulgaria to 
Yugoslavia which was considered the most dominant country in the Balkan area. Japan is a 
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similar case. Russia can be considered its main competitor in the years before the Great War 
and Soviet Union in the interwar period. Due to missing data for the Soviet Union Japan is 
matched to the US in the interwar years. For countries built on the ashes of the Hapsburg 
Empire, Germany was the main threat for the border disputes and for the design of a Pan-
Germanism Empire. On the contrary, Hungary considered Yugoslavia (as well as Romania) as 
the main rival for boundary disputes. 
 Another relevant point is the outcome of the arms race. The demand for military 
expenditure can be determined by the level of hostility in which a country is involved. Military 
actions have different amount of intensity, and require different resources in order to be 
mobilized. The large scale wars are an obvious example but other conflicts are also illustrative. 
With the exclusions of the Great War years, a moderate increase in the degree of hostility in the 
interwar era can be noted.  Episodes of maximum levels of hostility are few but the episodes of 
blockade, clash, occupation of territory, seizure and attack increased with respect to the pre-
World War I era9.  The idea behind the relationship between military burden and the level of 
hostilities is that an increase in military expenditure reflects the severity of the dispute. There is 
neither a remarkable difference between newly established countries and older nations nor any 
association between the level of hostility and the polity regime.  
The bulk of historical studies emphasised that the available resources in a country 
mattered in the formation of military spending. Figure 2 shows the unconditional relationship 
between the level of GDP per capita from Maddison (2010) and the military burden10. The 
purpose is to highlight a further control I consider throughout the text. In historical perspective, 
Harrison (1998), Broadberry and Harrison (2005) stressed that the role of economic 
development and the scale of employed resources in the mobilization of the two World Wars. 
The GDP per head counted for the outcomes of the global wars as this identified the resources 
potentially employable in such large conflicts. Economic resources are viewed as motor for 
mobilization in an armed conflict. The shorter the time a country has to reach a certain level of 
military capacity the higher the importance of these economic resources. Moreover, advances 
in defence technology also emphasize the relevance of GDP per capita as a measure of 
potential military capabilities. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Surprisingly, the previous picture shows a clear-cut negative relationship. The fitted line 
is steeper in the interwar years than in the period 1880-1913. Hence, two points are to be 
                                               
9
 Data for the levels of hostilities are from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (version 3.10) from Faten G., Palmer G., 
and Bremer S., (2004). 
10
 GDP per capita of the Hapsburg Empire is from Schulze (2000) rescaled at Maddison purchasing power parity 
11 | P a g e  
 
remarked. The first is that the positive association could hold in a highly intensive arm races, 
such as World Wars but not elsewhere. The second point is that the GDP effect might be 
different from that of Figure 2 when other determinants are considered. 
 
VI 
The previous concepts are introduced in a simple model to capture the military burden 
formation over time and across countries. Bearing in mind the more recent advances of the 
literature, the following dynamic specification for the military burden is considered: 
 
1log( ) log( ) iit it it it itMEBUR c MEBUR POLITYα β γ η ε−= + + + + +X                    (1) 
 
where: MEBUR is the nominal military expenditure over nominal GDP, POLITY  is a measure of 
the polity pattern, X is a vector of controls, iη  is the country fixed effect or the unobserved 
heterogeneity and itε is the error term. The set of controls includes the GDP per capita 
expressed in real value (GDPPC), the maximum level of hostility each country reaches in one 
period in a military interstate dispute (HOS), and the military burden of the main competitor 
(MEBURCOMP). The time dimension t covers the period 1880-1938 whereas the cross section 
units are 32. The panel is unbalanced. 
A model like (1) is usually estimated using the GMM estimator designed for dynamic 
panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991, Arellano and Bover, 1995, Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Even though the aforementioned estimators have received great attention in the literature, I am 
aware that some concerns in using such techniques have been recently raised. In this light, the 
best strategy is to use the largest possible set of econometric approaches made available by 
the literature. The first step is the classical dynamic panel data GMM approach. As the previous 
estimator is specifically thought for a large cross-section and small time dimension, in the 
presence of a long time dimension the model has to be rewritten in a convenient way: 
 
1 1 1log( ) log( ) iit it i t t itMEBUR c MEBUR POLITYτ τ τ τα β γ η ε− − − − − − −= + + + + +X       (2) 
 
In line with many historical studies that apply a dynamic panel data approach (i. e. 
Schularick and Solomou, 2011 and the cited literature), I take the average of the variables, 
setting 4τ = . An econometrics review of both system and dynamic GMM estimators points out 
that instruments proliferation is a problem (Rodman, 2008). The rule of thumb is that 
instruments cannot outnumber the observed units. By collapsing the matrix of instruments, I am 
able to set the number of instruments as close as possible to the number of units.  
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Table 3 shows results of the baseline model for the whole sample (columns 1 and 2) 
and for the subsample 1880-1913 (columns 3 and 4), and 1920-1938 (columns 5 and 6). The 
main result is that the move towards democracy makes the military burden lower. One more 
point in the polity score reduces the military expenditure of 2.63 up to 8.44 per cent, other 
things being equal. According to the estimations in Table 3 the liberal claim of democratization 
for a peaceful world is verified into the data.  
However, some disclaimers have to be applied. The model performs well in the whole 
sample and in the interwar years, but it is poor in the subsample 1880-1913. A look at columns 
3 and 4 reveals that the polity regime had no impact on the military burden in the years before 
World War I. Some concerns are raised to the extent that the coefficient of the polity score for 
1880-1913 has different signs according to the method of estimation, even though it is not 
significant. On the contrary, the results for the other samples are quite robust and the method 
of estimation does not alter the main finding.  
Table 3 also addresses some interpretations of the control variables. The military 
burden is by and large not explained by the mobilization capacity, as the existing literature 
would expect. In fact, the per capita GDP has the predicted sign in four out of six specifications 
but it is significant only in the DGMM of the whole sample. Again, the model for the subsample 
1880-1913 displays poor results. Here the GDP per capita is not significant and it is negative.  
Other classical variables of the military burden function are the hostility level (HOS) and 
the military burden of the main competitor (MEBURCOMP). The hostility level (HOS) enters into 
all the specifications with the expected sign and it is significant during the whole period. Indeed, 
the model seems to confirm the relationship between military expenditure and the severity of 
the interstate military disputes.  Moreover, the model provides us with evidence of the arm race 
effect captured by the military burden of the main rival. For the 1880-1938 and for the 1920-
1938 MEBURCOMP is significant and positive confirming that on average a country responds 
to the moves of its main competitor.  
The argument of the main rival does not hold during the years before World War I since 
the coefficient is not significant and negative. The last result is a further proof of the poor 
explicative power of the model for the subsample 1880-1913. In fact, although the model by 
and large works in a proper way for the whole sample and for the interwar years, it fails to shed 
light on the military burden formation in the decades before World War I.  
One explanation of the poor performance of the GMM estimator is the loss of 
information. The averaging procedure cuts the time dimension which is crucial to apply the 
dynamic GMM estimator but the information is dramatically reduced. On the contrary, annual 
data would allow for more information and for the chance to model both the short run and the 
long run relationship. To address the previous concerns and to exploit the information inside 
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the annual frequency, the pooled mean group estimator (PMG) is employed (Pesaran et al. 
1999). In a nutshell this method estimates an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in a 
panel data environment using an Error Correction Representation: 
 
 
where X is a set of control variables which includes the polity variable. The error term has to be 
i.i.d11 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The long run effect proves to be of interest because changes in the polity regimes 
reflect the historical pattern of institutions and need to be thought as of a slow process with 
possible deviation from the long run path. Table 4 is organized to show for each sample only 
the long run relationships. It is worth nothing that Pesaran et al. (1999) derive conditions of 
stability regardless of the order of integration of the variables. I exploit this finding as the 
stochastic properties of military burden are often unclear. The stability of the model and the 
existence of a long run relationship among the variables are confirmed by the sign and 
significance of  where it is the loading parameter of the long run relationship. 
Most of the results obtained from GMM estimators are also confirmed. I noticed a 
positive long run relationship of domestic military burden with the hostility level (HOS) and the 
military burden of the main rival (MEBURCOMP). These results broadly hold in all the 
subsample. On the contrary GDP per capita is irrelevant in the specification for the period 
1920-1938 whereas displays a negative association in the years before World War I.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
What about polity regimes? The existence of a long run relationship between military 
burden and democracy is largely accepted. According to the findings in Table 4, in the long run 
the spread of democracy would lead to committing fewer resources in the arms race supporting 
the Kantian claim of a perpetual peace. When the panel is split into two sub-periods, before 
1914 and after 1919, the hypothesis that more democratic regimes spend less in defence 
expenditure is no longer confirmed for the long run relationship. The polity score in the long run 
relationship is not significant in the period 1880-1913 and even has the wrong sign while it is 
strong and negative for the interwar years.   
                                               
11
 The PMG estimator  is consistent if the orthogonality condition among the residuals and the regressors holds. 
However, Pesaran (1997) shows that the long run estimator is also consistent whenever the regressors admit a finite 
autoregressive representation. The consistency is also reinforced by the introduction of more lags of the dependent 
variable. 
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The uncertain results of the polity pattern testify the contemporaneous effect of 
confounding factors at work. Section IV mentioned different possible channels of transmission 
from both democracy and autocracy to the military burden formation. Positive and negative 
effects come from the features of the polity pattern and they work simultaneously. Indeed, in 
the subsample 1880-1913, the positive effect of both democracy and autocracy seem to 
prevail, even though they appear to be not significant. On the contrary, the negative effect is 
clear in the subsample 1920-1938. Indeed, the previous results provide us a democracy puzzle. 
Since democracy displays its effects in different ways in different subsamples, we could wonder 
whether the working of democratic institutions has changed comparing pre and post-World War 
I eras. We may also wonder how autocratic features of polity regimes enter the puzzle.     
The composite measure of polity pattern I used is likely to hide the different institutional 
routes towards the military burden formation. In fact, one main shortcoming of the polity index is 
the masking of different polity patterns under the same score. This flaw has driven political 
scientists to look at the distinct element of political structure, testing alternatively democracy 
and autocracy in empirical studies (Doorspleet, 2000; Marshall et al., 2010). The exercise is 
developed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
The outcomes are not surprisingly consistent with our arguments in section IV and with 
the baseline results of Table 4. The democracy puzzle turns out to be robust to different 
measures of democracy and autocracy. In fact, democracy features of a polity regime provide 
powerful explanations of the military burden formation in the whole sample and in the interwar 
years but they fail to explain the military spending in the period 1880-1913. On the other side of 
the story, the autocratic feature seems to also play a role before World War I.  
 Both democratic and autocratic elements of a polity regime could positively and 
negatively influence military burden. State fiscal capacity, defined as the capacity to acquire 
resources through taxation, plays a central role. Let us consider that in the nineteenth century 
the transformation of state bureaucracies led to an increase of state fiscal capacity. More 
resources became available to increase public expenditure. In most cases bureaucracy’s 
modernization went hand in hand with democratization. Thus, state capacity is the first channel 
through which polity regimes influence the military burden formation. The availability of a larger 
amount of resources allowed policy makers of more democratic countries to allocate more 
funds to military expenditure than the policy makers of autocratic regimes could afford. The 
countries in which the autocratic regimes prevailed maintained less efficient bureaucracies and 
low state capacity. Indeed, two forces were at work in the period 1880-1913. The first is the 
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positive channel through which democracy affected the military burden via the modernization of 
bureaucracy increasing resources for military expenditure. The second one is the prevailing 
positive effect of autocratic regimes in shaping the military burden. Hence, the ancient agrarian 
bureaucracies had lesser funds than modern democracies squeezing military expenditure. 
However, this effect was more than offset by the attitude of autocratic countries to spend more 
than democratic ones, as suggested by common sense. 
Moreover, since the democratic elements of the polity regimes deploy their effect in 
lowering military spending in the interwar period, this means that the positive effect of 
bureaucracy’s modernization had been offset and overwhelmed by other elements of the 
democratization process which came to the fore after World War I. 
 
VI 
From the previous section it has emerged that most of the puzzle is explained by 
bureaucracy modernization along with a clear effect of autocracy towards an increase of 
military expenditure. Since different forces were at work during the 1880-1913 and 1920-1938 
some historical considerations on the links between democracy and the functioning of the 
economy shed light on the puzzling results. 
The concept of democracy is built upon two great categories. The first is the way in 
which the recruitment of government is carried out and the constraints a government faces in 
terms of checks and balances. The second is the popular participation in policy making 
decisions and to the elections. Both of these are strongly linked as wider participation ushers 
more binding constraints to executive. Indeed, an ultimate determinant of the policy decisions 
comes from the extent to which the citizens are enfranchised and they are able to influence 
government decisions both directly and indirectly. 
XIX Century democratic countries limited popular participation in many ways by 
restricting the voting right to some clusters of the population. Limits to women participation and 
enfranchising by wealth or by level of schooling were the norm in the democratic countries of 
the nineteenth century as well as of the first half of twentieth century.  
In fact, public control is a component of democracy and it did not evolve at the same 
pace as bureaucracy modernization. The transformation of bureaucracy often preceded the 
widening of political participation. The policy makers of democracies in transition with modern 
bureaucracies had more freedom in allocating public resources than autocracies with olden 
agrarian bureaucracies.  
Indeed, I believe that the inconsistent timing between modernization and full 
democratization in the four decades before World War I explains the controversial behaviour of 
democratic institutions. Since political participation was restricted to elite classes and cases of 
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public involvement in political activity were infrequent, the interests of policy makers matched 
the interests of the enfranchised elite classes (Acemoglu et al.2005). This feature of the 
democracy mattered to the extent that popular participation can affect policy decisions and 
thereby public resource allocation. In the case of enfranchising by wealth, upper classes often 
share economic interests in wars with the government in charge thus increasing military 
burden. This happens when the wealthy class gains from public outlays and shares the costs 
with the rest of citizens through non progressive taxation or debt issues. 
A look at the historical data on social transfers seems to confirm the previous 
arguments. Lindert (2004) argues that before 1945 fuller democracies spent more on social 
spending than autocracies and incomplete democracies. In principle, because democracies 
become fuller by enfranchising the lower income population, a wider political participation 
increases the support of redistributive programs. Moreover, the fostering of social spending 
implies a change in the preferences of policy makers via political participation. This happened 
in the aftermaths of World War I when popular participation increased12. After World War I the 
working and middle classes perceived wars as a source of costs and as a loss of welfare. 
Indeed they posed more binding constraints to government decisions in allocating public 
resources for military purposes.  
Furthermore, the effect of democratization can be viewed by considering the 
government utility function. The executives maximize their behaviour under both the state fiscal 
capacity and the social consensus constraints. Let us suppose that governments assumed that 
the national utility would be increased by the consolidation of borders (especially for newly 
established countries and small countries), by the acquisition of overseas lands (old and new 
colonial powers) and by a hegemony design (Latin American and Asian hegemonic countries). 
Let us also suppose that governments derive utility from social spending13 which the working 
and perhaps middle classes were more interested in. Thus, the idea is that the lower the 
constraint to government policies the higher the degrees of freedom in the allocation of public 
resources. Whenever governments prioritize the consolidation of borders, acquisition of 
overseas lands and the hegemony design, military expenditure should increase at the expense 
of social spending. This hypothesis cannot be directly tested since neither the annual social 
spending or the total public expenditure is available for all the countries in the sample. However 
I can test whether the social consensus constraint, proxied by the political participation, 
mattered for determining military burden.  
                                               
12
 Nine countries out of the total number of countries observed in both of the periods worsened their popular 
participation, fourteen did better, and five kept the rate of participation unchanged. The newly established countries 
in the interwar years did not better and they maintained a high degree of exclusion. 
13
 It is reasonable to assume that all the aforementioned elements contribute to the national utility function with 
different weights for the policy makers. 
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The degree of democratization is measured by two components. The first is public 
participation and the second is executive constraints. The increase in public participation brings 
about a tighter constraint to the government’s decision. In turn, executive constraints are also 
fixed by the current law which reflects past institutional changes. Although they are 
indistinguishable elements of democracy, political participation virtually captures public control 
over the government decisions and the executive constraints pick up the regulatory setup for 
the government in charge. 
Table 6 uses the pooled mean group estimator to test the different components of 
democracy, public participation and regulatory executive constraints14.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Let me note that over the whole period under scrutiny both public control and regulatory 
constraints to the executives lowered the military burden. However, from a statistical point of 
view the coefficient of political participation is larger and more significant than regulatory 
constraints. Fundamentally, the role of public participation is emphasised by a comparison 
between the pre-World War I era and the interwar years. Before 1914, the democracy puzzle 
was still alive. None of the democracy components deploy effects over the military burden, 
even though the political participation has a negative sign. The width of enfranchisement and a 
more conscious involvement of people in the political process during the interwar years 
triggered the Kantian effect of democratization over the military burden. 
 Indeed, the empirical exercise provides us with suggestions for further interpretations of 
the democracy puzzle. Why did political participation and regulatory constraints to the 
executives determine a new attitude of governments towards military expenditure? The 
upheavals of the Great War compelled executives to widen political participation by 
enfranchising a larger share of the population. The new voters asked for more social spending 
(Linderet, 2004) reinforcing the non-regulatory constraints to policy makers’ choices. Since the 
political voice is expected to be more persuasive after World War I than it was in the years 
before, the executives faced tighter constraints on allocating public resources. Even though this 
pattern was in the making in some countries before 1914, it is relevant just after 1919.  
The dramatic aftermaths of the Great War modified the social consensus about the 
choice to engage in conflicts and they defined a new equilibrium between state and citizen 
expectations. A new perspective in the public resources allocation emerged by the combined 
effect of building the social welfare and larger public control. Governments which satisfied an 
                                               
14
 Even though the specification is the same of Tables 4 and 5, I adopt a lower order for the autoregressive 
component. This is due to technicalities with respect to the convergence of the Maximum Likelihood estimator which 
prevent to use two lags in the autoregressive component for the subsample 1880-1913 and 1920-1938.  
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increasing demand for public goods lost freedom in allocating public resources. Public control 
proceeded hand in hand with the improvement of democracy reducing the discretion of 
governments and applying a stronger pressure on politicians. Moreover, the Great War 
encouraged government to control public opinion and to contextually take account of the 
citizens’ feelings.  
On the contrary, the public control was weak, the social spending was lower and the 
military expenditure was higher where the disequilibria of World War I led to the autocratization, 
such as in Italy or in the early 1930s in Germany. 
The explanation of a perverse effect of democratization before World War I lies in the 
same line of argument. The more democratic countries differed from ancient agrarian 
bureaucracies by their capacity to drain resources through fiscal capacity. A better organized 
bureaucracy was more efficient in collecting taxes but political participation was too weak to 
trigger the Kantian effect. This result strengthens the hypothesis that only a full democracy 
associated with wide political participation can, in the long run, reduce military expenditure. On 
the contrary non-full or limited democracies tend to spend more on defence purposes. This 
conclusion confirms recent theoretical findings that predict a higher probability to wage a war 
for the non-full democratic regimes (Hess and Orphanides 2001, Baliga et al. 2011). 
 
VII 
In the last two hundred years the historical evidence had questioned the idea that the 
widespread of democracy should reduce the frequency of war and thereby the military 
spending across the world. In this paper the role of democratization on the military expenditure 
has been considered using the as large as possible sample of countries observed in the period 
1880-1938. The first wave of democratization (1880-1926) and the reverse phase of 
autocratization (1926 onwards) provide the ideal setting to test the Kantian hypothesis that the 
more democratic countries spend less for military purposes than autocratic regimes. The first 
result of the paper is the existence of a democracy puzzle. The Kantian claim seems to hold in 
the interwar years but not in the first era of democratization, thus questioning a widely accepted 
stylized fact in the political science literature. The puzzle is explained by considering both the 
state fiscal capacity and the political participation. In the nineteenth century, countries on the 
way of democratization ameliorate their bureaucracies which in turn increased the capacity to 
gain resources throughout taxation. However, at that stage democratization failed in the 
enlargement of political participation. Thus, the inconsistent timing between the bureaucracy  
modernization and enlargement of political participation facilitate the freedom of policy makers 
in allocating public funds for military purposes. After World War I, the political participation 
widened and the demand for social spending rose dramatically. The improvement of 
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democracy throughout a wider political participation reduced the freedom of policy makers, 
making the trade-off between social and military spending more costly in terms of social 
consensus. Hence, the second result of this paper is that a necessary condition to trigger the 
Kantian effect of a democratic and thereby peaceful world is the enlargement of the political 
participation. 
The previous results have further implications for current times. First of all, they 
empirically support recent theoretical results that non full democracies spend more for defense 
than autocracies and full democracies (Hess and Orphanides 2000, Baliga et al. 2011). 
Secondly, our results raise some concerns about recent changes in the XX Century agrarian 
bureaucracies which modernized bureaucracies and increased their state capacity but are 
failing to build a wide and effective political participation.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics of the Military burden in selected countries  
  1880-1913   1920-1938 
State 
Observed 
since Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max   
Observed 
since Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
            
ARG 1884 0.0159 0.0059 0.0099 0.0319  1920 0.0034 0.0010 0.0022 0.0056 
AUH 1880 0.0218 0.0024 0.0180 0.0301   . . . . 
AUL  . . . .  1920 0.0034 0.0014 0.0021 0.0079 
AUS  . . . .  1924 0.0108 0.0052 0.0067 0.0223 
BEL 1880 0.0107 0.0011 0.0085 0.0125  1920 0.0082 0.0067 0.0020 0.0196 
BRA 1880 0.0297 0.0099 0.0158 0.0522  1920 0.0225 0.0101 0.0062 0.0435 
BUL  . . . .  1924 0.0305 0.0139 0.0185 0.0546 
CAN 1880 0.0032 0.0019 0.0018 0.0122  1920 0.0038 0.0014 0.0024 0.0067 
CZE  . . . .  1920 0.0337 0.0093 0.0240 0.0509 
DEN 1880 0.0142 0.0029 0.0106 0.0211  1920 0.0077 0.0026 0.0048 0.0141 
FIN  . . . .  1921 0.0276 0.0045 0.0207 0.0362 
FRN 1880 0.0350 0.0068 0.0266 0.0436  1920 0.0190 0.0111 0.0068 0.0422 
GMY 1880 0.0242 0.0033 0.0201 0.0347  1920 0.0280 0.0422 0.0015 0.1738 
HUN  . . . .  1925 0.0227 0.0091 0.0145 0.0403 
ITA 1880 0.0322 0.0073 0.0220 0.0519  1920 0.0634 0.0380 0.0275 0.1614 
JPN 1885 0.0577 0.0567 0.0134 0.2589  1920 0.0542 0.0338 0.0278 0.1434 
MEX 1900 0.0085 0.0020 0.0065 0.0143  1920 0.0187 0.0049 0.0119 0.0293 
NEW  . . . .  1920 0.0025 0.0019 0.0001 0.0064 
NOR 1884 0.0152 0.0025 0.0113 0.0207  1920 0.0092 0.0011 0.0072 0.0122 
NTH 1880 0.0278 0.0033 0.0207 0.0341  1920 0.0151 0.0038 0.0100 0.0247 
PER 1900 0.0085 0.0017 0.0043 0.0107  1920 0.0102 0.0040 0.0005 0.0165 
POR 1880 0.0200 0.0057 0.0103 0.0334  1920 0.0238 0.0056 0.0138 0.0365 
ROM  . . . .  1926 0.0256 0.0056 0.0157 0.0326 
RUS 1885 0.0154 0.0066 0.0083 0.0434   . . . . 
SPN 1880 0.0177 0.0022 0.0134 0.0237  1920 0.0304 0.0081 0.0161 0.0415 
SWD 1880 0.0228 0.0042 0.0173 0.0320  1920 0.0160 0.0032 0.0123 0.0236 
SWZ 1880 0.0119 0.0021 0.0093 0.0194  1920 0.0212 0.0126 0.0112 0.0569 
UKG 1880 0.0264 0.0103 0.0161 0.0613  1920 0.0321 0.0143 0.0185 0.0697 
URU 1900 0.0082 0.0027 0.0010 0.0117  1920 0.0106 0.0009 0.0095 0.0117 
USA 1880 0.0073 0.0028 0.0043 0.0183  1920 0.0100 0.0035 0.0057 0.0191 
VEN  . . . .  1920 0.0145 0.0038 0.0073 0.0227 
YUG   . . . .   1924 0.0480 0.0153 0.0133 0.0696 
Source: see text and footnotes 
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Table 2 Summary statistics of the Polity score (polity2) in selected countries  
  1880-1913   1920-1938 
State Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
          
ARG 1.06 0.24 1 2  -1.37 5.28 -8.00 5.00 
AUH -4.00 0.00 -4 -4  . . . . 
AUL . . . .  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
AUS . . . .  3.53 7.15 -9.00 8.00 
BEL 6.03 0.17 6 7  9.47 0.51 9.00 10.00 
BRA -3.79 1.34 -6 -3  -4.53 1.81 -7.00 -3.00 
BUL . . . .  -4.68 2.96 -10.00 -3.00 
CAN 7.82 2.15 4 9  9.95 0.23 9.00 10.00 
CZE . . . .  7.00 0.00 7.00 7.00 
DEN -0.68 3.51 -3 8  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
FIN . . . .  7.32 2.98 4.00 10.00 
FRN 7.47 0.51 7 8  9.47 0.51 9.00 10.00 
GMY -0.32 2.43 -4 2  1.26 7.16 -9.00 6.00 
HUN . . . .  -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 
ITA -2.76 1.50 -4 -1  -6.89 3.05 -9.00 -1.00 
JPN 1.00 0.00 1 1  1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MEX -8.21 2.59 -9 0  -4.00 2.08 -6.00 -1.00 
NEW 9.62 0.49 9 10  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
NOR 3.41 6.33 -4 10  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
NTH -2.26 0.45 -3 -2  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
PER 1.38 1.68 -3 2  -4.58 5.17 -9.00 2.00 
POR -2.59 3.89 -9 7  -2.26 7.41 -9.00 7.00 
ROM -6.35 0.98 -7 -4  -4.11 0.46 -6.00 -4.00 
RUS -9.00 1.72 -10 -6  . . . . 
SPN 4.97 0.94 4 6  1.63 6.36 -7.00 7.00 
SWD -2.97 2.41 -4 5  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
SWZ 10.00 0.00 10 10  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
UKG 7.38 0.49 7 8  9.79 0.63 8.00 10.00 
URU -1.88 1.84 -3 2  2.21 1.36 0.00 3.00 
USA 10.00 0.00 10 10  10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 
VEN . . . .  -8.32 1.42 -9.00 -5.00 
YUG . . . .   -4.72 4.79 -10.00 0.00 
Source: see text and footnotes       
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Figure 1 Association between Military Burden and Polity score in two sub-sample 1880-1913 
and 1920-1938 (WWI year are excluded. Log scale). 
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Source: see text and footnotes for details. 
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Figure 2 Association between Military Burden and GDP per capita in two sub-sample 1880-
1913 and 1920-1938 (WWI year are excluded. Log scale). 
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Source: see text and footnotes for details. 
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Table 3. Dynamic and System GMM estimations. Dependent variable: Log of Military Burden 
 1880-1938 1880-1913 1920-1938 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SGMM DGMM SGMM DGMM SGMM DGMM 
              
Log of military burden (t-1) 0.169** 0.0403 0.526*** -0.0442 0.150 -0.0145 
 (0.0743) (0.0835) (0.101) (0.141) (0.109) (0.119) 
       
Log of GDP per capita 0.334 0.452* -0.0272 -0.366 0.926 0.192 
 (0.228) (0.233) (0.302) (0.323) (0.604) (0.698) 
       
Polity Score -0.0571*** -0.0704*** -0.0263 0.0476 -0.0773*** -0.0844** 
 (0.0121) (0.0239) (0.0160) (0.0360) (0.0213) (0.0384) 
       
MEBURCOMP 0.139*** 0.133** -0.0202 -0.265 0.154** 0.112 
 (0.0503) (0.0643) (0.199) (0.359) (0.0675) (0.0883) 
       
HOS 0.137*** 0.145*** 0.0594* 0.0356 0.168** 0.151 
 (0.0368) (0.0555) (0.0339) (0.0438) (0.0683) (0.0924) 
       
Constant -5.462***  -1.806  -10.18**  
 (1.880)  (2.916)  (4.910)  
       
m1 -5.04 -7.85 -4.38 -3.32 -3.61 -5.31 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
m2 1.27 0.97 2.48 1.33 0.72 0.08 
 0.42 0.33 0.01 0.18 0.47 0.94 
       
Sargan 25.75 20.74 30.78 10.13 17.52 14.52 
 0.42 0.71 0.01 0.81 0.62 0.95 
       
       
# instruments 31 30 21 20 30 26 
Observations 308 276 155 133 153 143 
Number of countries 32 32 22 22 30 30 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Pooled mean group estimator. Dependent variable: log of Military burden. ARDL (2, 1, 1, 1, 1)  
  
1880-1938 
WWI excluded   1880-1913   1920-1938   
  (4)   (2)   (3)   
              
Log of Mebur (t-2) -0.365*** 0.178*** -0.299*** 
(0.0946) (0.0646) (0.0775) 
Polity score -0.0287*** 0.00797 -0.0274*** 
 
(0.00526) (0.00757) (0.00580) 
 Log of GDP per capita 0.140* -0.476*** 0.0888 
 
(0.0768) (0.0805) (0.115) 
 MEBURCOMP 0.328*** 0.117** 0.315*** 
(0.0517) (0.0571) (0.0559) 
HOS 0.0545*** 0.0472*** 0.192*** 
(0.0192) (0.0121) (0.0345) 
φ 
 
-0.255*** -0.285*** -0.321*** 
(0.0360) (0.0758) (0.0467) 
Constant -1.348*** 0.184*** -1.511*** 
(0.187) (0.0352) (0.233) 
Countries 32  22  30  
Observations 1,165   626   539   
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Short run variables omitted to save space. 
Available upon request. 
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Table 5. Pooled mean group estimator. Dependent variable: Log of Military burden (Mebur). Long run relationships 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1880-1938 
WWI excluded 1880-1913 1920-1938 
1880-1938 
WWI 
excluded 1880-1913 1920-1938 
              
Log of Mebur (t-2) -0.391*** -0.339** -0.301*** -0.331*** -0.260* -0.509*** 
(0.0926) (0.167) (0.0774) (0.0912) (0.146) (0.0890) 
Democracy -0.0596*** 0.0215 -0.0667*** 
(0.00998) (0.0167) (0.0114) 
Autocracy 0.0611*** 0.106*** 0.0556*** 
(0.0101) (0.0290) (0.00890) 
log of GDP per capita 0.109 0.0349 -0.174 0.135* 0.0795 -0.353** 
(0.0789) (0.0898) (0.149) (0.0753) (0.0871) (0.144) 
MEBURCOMP 0.270*** -0.0705 0.241*** 0.291*** 0.0846 0.0524* 
(0.0487) (0.0694) (0.0482) (0.0470) (0.0744) (0.0279) 
HOS 0.0573*** 0.0427*** 0.127*** 0.0525*** 0.0476*** 0.0609*** 
(0.0192) (0.0122) (0.0327) (0.0184) (0.0143) (0.0234) 
Φ -0.255*** -0.269*** -0.318*** -0.257*** -0.241*** -0.268*** 
(0.0404) (0.0618) (0.0493) (0.0383) (0.0646) (0.0522) 
Countries 32 22 30 32 22 30 
Observations 1,165 626 539 1,165 626 539 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Short run variables omitted to save space. Available upon 
request. 
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Table 6. Pooled mean group estimator. Dependent variable: Log of Military burden (Mebur).  
ARDL (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) in columns (1) (2) and (3), ARDL (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) in column (4). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1880-1938 
WWI excluded 1880-1913 1920-1938 
1880-1938 
WWI excluded 
          
Log of Mebur (t-2) -17.74*** 
(3.491) 
political participation -0.0499*** -0.102 -0.178*** -0.0598*** 
(0.0129) (0.0758) (0.0425) (0.0129) 
regulatory constraints -0.0167 0.0252 -0.0285 -0.0182 
(0.0302) (0.0655) (0.0198) (0.0388) 
log of GDP per capita 0.265*** -0.279** -1.247*** 0.152* 
(0.0874) (0.119) (0.169) (0.0842) 
MEBURCOMP 0.327*** 0.432*** 0.193*** 0.376*** 
(0.0430) (0.102) (0.0229) (0.0558) 
HOS 0.0706*** 0.107*** 0.0174 0.0562*** 
(0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0166) (0.0214) 
φ -0.310*** -0.263*** -0.331*** -0.249*** 
(0.0461) (0.0578) (0.0593) (0.0378) 
Countries 32 22 30 32 
Observations 1,165 626 539 1,165 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Short run variables omitted to save space. Available upon request. Columns 1, 2, 3 adopt an 
ARDL (1, 1, 1,1, 1, 1) model while column 4 adopts an ARDL (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) model. See 
footnote 13 for more details. 
 
 
